"Comments on Nir Ben Moshe's 'An Adam Smithian Account of Moral Reasons'" Central APA, Denver CO, 2/23/19
"Empathy and Humane Understanding" Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting Panel: Learning from Emotions Cincinnati OH, 3/7/19-3/8/19 Abstract: Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective-taking. Critics of empathy argue that we must reject the commonsense conception of empathy as essential to virtuous social life. They contend that empathy tends to enhance moral myopia and provincialism, and they suggest that the goods empathy seemed fit to secure for us– knowledge of others' inner lives, judgment of others' emotions, altruistic motivation– are all available through less risky means. In response, I argue that this criticism overlooks empathy's most significant and interesting feature: it is the unique source of a particular form of epistemic good. Attempts to articulate the epistemic benefits of empathy have generally focused on its contribution to (1) knowledge of others’ mental states or (2) the formation of judgments about whether others’ attitudes are morally appropriate. I argue that such analyses miss out on empathy’s signal epistemic good; empathy is necessary and sufficient for the firsthand appreciation of the emotional intelligibility of others’ attitudes. This appreciation, which I call humane understanding, is an epistemic good that is non-instrumentally morally valuable. Achieving this form of understanding is itself a way of caring, rather than just a means to promote other caring behavior.
"Seeing Myself in You" Empathy and / or . . . : Ways of Caring, Harvard Conference of Mind, Brain, and Behavior Cambridge MA, 3/14/19-3/15/19
"Evaluative Perception and Empathetic Dialogue" American Philosophies Forum 2019 Conference: Truth Atlanta, GA, 4/4/19-4/6/19